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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-1660
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ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. ISAAC EVANS
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
arizona
[March 1, 1995]

  Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
  This case presents the question whether evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by an
officer who acted in reliance on a police record indicating
the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant-a record
that is later determined to be erroneous-must be
suppressed by virtue of the exclusionary rule regardless
of the source of the error.  The Supreme Court of
Arizona held that the exclusionary rule required sup-
pression of evidence even if the erroneous information
resulted from an error committed by an employee of the
office of the Clerk of Court.  We disagree.
  In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent
observed respondent Evans driving the wrong way on a
one-way street in front of the police station.  The officer
stopped respondent and asked to see his driver's license.
After respondent told him that his license had been
suspended, the officer entered respondent's name into a
computer data terminal located in his patrol car.  The
computer inquiry confirmed that respondent's license had
been suspended and also indicated that there was an
outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest.  Based
upon the outstanding warrant, Officer Sargent placed
respondent under arrest.  While being handcuffed,
respondent dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that the
officers determined smelled of marijuana.  Officers
proceeded to search his car and discovered a bag of
marijuana under the passenger's seat.
  The State charged respondent with possession of mari-
juana.  When the police notified the Justice Court that
they had arrested him, the Justice Court discovered that
the arrest warrant previously had been quashed and so
advised the police.  Respondent argued that because his
arrest was based on a warrant that had been quashed
17 days prior to his arrest, the marijuana seized
incident to the arrest should be suppressed as the fruit
of an unlawful arrest.  Respondent also argued that
-[t]he `good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule
[was] inapplicable . . . because it was police error, not
judicial error, which caused the invalid arrest.-  App. 5.
  At the suppression hearing, the Chief Clerk of the
Justice Court testified that a Justice of the Peace had
issued the arrest warrant on December 13, 1990,
because respondent had failed to appear to answer for
several traffic violations.  On December 19, 1990,
respondent appeared before a pro tem Justice of the
Peace who entered a notation in respondent's file to
-quash warrant.-  Id., at 13.
  The Chief Clerk also testified regarding the standard
court procedure for quashing a warrant.  Under that
procedure a justice court clerk calls and informs the
warrant section of the Sheriff's Office when a warrant
has been quashed.  The Sheriff's Office then removes the
warrant from its computer records.  After calling the
Sheriff's Office, the clerk makes a note in the
individual's file indicating the clerk who made the phone
call and the person at the Sheriff's Office to whom the
clerk spoke.  The Chief Clerk testified that there was no
indication in respondent's file that a clerk had called
and notified the Sheriff's Office that his arrest warrant
had been quashed.  A records clerk from the Sheriff's
Office also testified that the Sheriff's Office had no
record of a telephone call informing it that respondent's
arrest warrant had been quashed.  Id., at 42-43.
  At the close of testimony, respondent argued that the
evidence obtained as a result of the arrest should be
suppressed because -the purposes of the exclusionary
rule would be served here by making the clerks for the
court, or the clerk for the Sheriff's office, whoever is
responsible for this mistake, to be more careful about
making sure that warrants are removed from the
records.-  Id., at 47.  The trial court granted the motion
to suppress because it concluded that the State had been
at fault for failing to quash the warrant.  Presumably
because it could find no -distinction between State
action, whether it happens to be the police department
or not,- id., at 52, the trial court made no factual
finding as to whether the Justice Court or Sheriff's
Office was responsible for the continued presence of the
quashed warrant in the police records.
  A divided panel of the Arizona Court of Appeals re-
versed because it -believe[d] that the exclusionary rule
[was] not intended to deter justice court employees or
Sheriff's Office employees who are not directly associated
with the arresting officers or the arresting officers' police
department.-  172 Ariz. 314, 317, 836 P. 2d 1024, 1027
(1992).  Therefore, it concluded, -the purpose of the
exclusionary rule would not be served by excluding the
evidence obtained in this case.- Ibid.
  The Arizona Supreme Court reversed.  177 Ariz. 201,
866 P. 2d 869 (1994).  The court rejected the -distinction
drawn by the court of appeals . . . between clerical
errors committed by law enforcement personnel and
similar mistakes by court employees.-  Id., at 203, 866
P. 2d, at 871.  The court predicted that application of
the exclusionary rule would -hopefully serve to improve
the efficiency of those who keep records in our criminal
justice system.-  Id., at 204, 866 P. 2d, at 872.  Finally,
the Court concluded that -[e]ven assuming that deter-
rence is the principal reason for application of the
exclusionary rule, we disagree with the court of appeals
that such a purpose would not be served where careless-
ness by a court clerk results in an unlawful arrest.-
Ibid.
  We granted certiorari to determine whether the
exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized
incident to an arrest resulting from an inaccurate
computer record, regardless of whether police personnel
or court personnel were responsible for the record's
continued presence in the police computer.  511 U. S.
___ (1994).  We now reverse.
  We first must consider whether we have jurisdiction
to review the Arizona Supreme Court's decision.
Respondent argues that we lack jurisdiction under 28
U. S. C. 1257 because the Arizona Supreme Court
never passed upon the Fourth Amendment issue and
instead based its decision on the Arizona good-faith
statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-3925 (1993), an
adequate and independent state ground.  In the alterna-
tive, respondent asks that we remand to the Arizona
Supreme Court for clarification.
  In Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), we
adopted a standard for determining whether a state-
court decision rested upon an adequate and independent
state ground.  When -a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy
and independence of any possible state law ground is
not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court
decided the case the way it did because it believed that
federal law required it to do so.-  Id., at 1040-1041.  We
adopted this practice, in part, to obviate the -unsatisfac-
tory and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to
clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court.-
Id., at 1041.  We also concluded that this approach
would -provide state judges with a clearer opportunity
to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal
interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of
federal law.-  Ibid.
  Justice Ginsburg would overrule Michigan v. Long,
supra, because she believes that the rule of that case
-impedes the States' ability to serve as laboratories for
testing solutions to novel legal problems.-  Post, at 2.
The opinion in Long describes the 60-year history of the
Court's differing approaches to the determination
whether the judgment of the highest court of a State
rested on federal or nonfederal grounds.  463 U. S., at
1038-1040.  When we were in doubt, on some occasions
we dismissed the writ of certiorari; on other occasions
we vacated the judgment of the state court and remanded
so that it might clarify the basis for its decision.  See
ibid.  The latter approach did not always achieve the
desired result and burdened the state courts with
additional work.  Ibid.
  We believe that Michigan v. Long properly serves its
purpose and should not be disturbed.  Under it, state
courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitu-
tional provisions to accord greater protection to individ-
ual rights than do similar provisions of the United
States Constitution.  They also are free to serve as
experimental laboratories, in the sense that Justice
Brandeis used that term in his dissenting opinion in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311
(1932) (urging that the Court not impose federal consti-
tutional restraints on the efforts of a State to -serve as
a laboratory-).  Under our decision today, the State of
Arizona remains free to seek whatever solutions it
chooses to problems of law enforcement posed by the
advent of computerization.  Indeed, it is freer to do so
because it is disabused of its erroneous view of what the
United States Constitution requires.
  State courts, in appropriate cases, are not merely free
to-they are bound to-interpret the United States
Constitution.  In doing so, they are not free from the
final authority of this Court.  This principle was
enunciated in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821),
and presumably Justice Ginsburg does not quarrel
with it.  In Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S.
551 (1940), we recognized that our authority as final
arbiter of the United States Constitution could be eroded
by a lack of clarity in state-court decisions.
-It is fundamental that state courts be left free and
unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitu-
tions.  But it is equally important that ambiguous
or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand
as barriers to a determination by this Court of the
validity under the federal constitution of state
action.  Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers
compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscuri-
ties and ambiguities from the opinions in such
cases. . . .  For no other course assures that impor-
tant federal issues, such as have been argued here,
will reach this Court for adjudication; that state
courts will not be the final arbiters of important
issues under the federal constitution; and that we
will not encroach on the constitutional jurisdiction of
the states.-  Id., at 557.
We therefore adhere to the standard adopted in Michi-
gan v. Long, supra.
  Applying that standard here, we conclude that we
have jurisdiction.  In reversing the Court of Appeals, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated that -[w]hile it may be
inappropriate to invoke the exclusionary rule where a
magistrate has issued a facially valid warrant (a
discretionary judicial function) based on an erroneous
evaluation of the facts, the law, or both, Leon, 468 U. S.
897 . . . (1984), it is useful and proper to do so where
negligent record keeping (a purely clerical function)
results in an unlawful arrest.-  177 Ariz., at 204, 866 P.
2d, at 872.  Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court's decision
to suppress the evidence was based squarely upon its
interpretation of federal law.  See ibid.  Nor did it offer
a plain statement that its references to federal law were
-being used only for the purpose of guidance, and d[id]
not themselves compel the result that [it] reached.-
Long, supra, at 1041.
  The Fourth Amendment states that -[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.-  U. S. Const.  We have
recognized, however, that the Fourth Amendment
contains no provision expressly precluding the use of
evidence obtained in violation of its commands.  See
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984).  -The
wrong condemned by the [Fourth] Amendment is `fully
accomplished' by the unlawful search or seizure itself,-
ibid. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
354 (1974)), and the use of the fruits of a past unlawful
search or seizure -`work[s] no new Fourth Amendment
wrong,'- Leon, supra, at 906 (quoting Calandra, supra,
at 354).
  -The question whether the exclusionary rule's remedy
is appropriate in a particular context has long been
regarded as an issue separate from the question whether
the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to
invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.-  Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 223 (1983); see also United
States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627-628 (1980); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486-487 (1976); Calandra,
supra, at 348.  The exclusionary rule operates as a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against
future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through
the rule's general deterrent effect.  Leon, supra, at 906;
Calandra, supra, at 348.  As with any remedial device,
the rule's application has been restricted to those
instances where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served.  Leon, supra, at 908; Calandra,
supra, at 348.  Where -the exclusionary rule does not
result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use
. . . is unwarranted.-  United States v. Janis, 428 U. S.
433, 454 (1976).
  In Leon, we applied these principles to the context of
a police search in which the officers had acted in
objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant,
issued by a neutral and detached Magistrate, that later
was determined to be invalid.  468 U. S., at 905.  On
the basis of three factors, we determined that there was
no sound reason to apply the exclusionary rule as a
means of deterring misconduct on the part of judicial
officers who are responsible for issuing warrants.  See
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 348 (1987) (analyzing
Leon, supra).  First, we noted that the exclusionary rule
was historically designed -`to deter police misconduct
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magis-
trates.'-  Krull, supra, at 348 (quoting Leon, supra, at
916).  Second, there was -`no evidence suggesting that
judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert
the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these
actors requires the application of the extreme sanction
of exclusion.'-  Krull, supra, at 348 (quoting Leon, supra,
at 916).  Third, and of greatest importance, there was
no basis for believing that exclusion of evidence seized
pursuant to a warrant would have a significant deter-
rent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate.  Krull,
supra, at 348.
  The Leon Court then examined whether application of
the exclusionary rule could be expected to alter the
behavior of the law enforcement officers.  We concluded:
-[W]here the officer's conduct is objectively reason-
able, `excluding the evidence will not further the
ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable
way; for it is painfully apparent that . . . the officer
is acting as a reasonable officer would and should
act in similar circumstances.  Excluding the evidence
can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is
to make him less willing to do his duty.'-  Leon,
supra, at 919-920 (quoting Stone v. Powell, supra,
at 539-540 (White, J., dissenting)).
See also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981,
990-991 (1984) (-[S]uppressing evidence because the
judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections
despite his assurances that such changes would be made
will not serve the deterrent function that the
exclusionary rule was designed to achieve-).  Thus, we
held that the -marginal or nonexistent benefits produced
by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reason-
able reliance on a subsequently invalidated search
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclu-
sion.-  Leon, supra, at 922.
  Respondent relies on United States v. Hensley, 469
U. S. 221 (1985), and argues that the evidence seized
incident to his arrest should be suppressed because he
was the victim of a Fourth Amendment violation.  Brief
for Respondent 10-12, 21-22.  In Hensley, the Court
determined that evidence uncovered as a result of a
Terry stop was admissible because the officers who made
the stop acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a
flyer that had been issued by officers of another police
department who possessed a reasonable suspicion to
justify a Terry stop.  469 U. S., at 231.  Because the
Hensley Court determined that there had been no Fourth
Amendment violation, id., at 236, the Court never
considered whether the seized evidence should have been
excluded.  Hensley does not contradict our earlier
pronouncements that -[t]he question whether the
exclusionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular
context has long been regarded as an issue separate
from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights
of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by
police conduct.-  Gates, supra, at 223; see also Stone v.
Powell, supra, at 486-487; Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348.
  Respondent also argues that Whiteley v. Warden,
Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560 (1971),
compels exclusion of the evidence.  In Whiteley, the
Court determined that the Fourth Amendment had been
violated when police officers arrested Whiteley and
recovered inculpatory evidence based upon a radio report
that two suspects had been involved in two robberies.
Id., at 568-569.  Although the -police were entitled to
act on the strength of the radio bulletin,- the Court
determined that there had been a Fourth Amendment
violation because the initial complaint, upon which the
arrest warrant and subsequent radio bulletin were
based, was insufficient to support an independent
judicial assessment of probable cause.  Id., at 568.  The
Court concluded that -an otherwise illegal arrest cannot
be insulated from challenge by the decision of the
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the
arrest.-  Ibid.  Because the -arrest violated [Whiteley's]
constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments; the evidence secured as an incident
thereto should have been excluded from his trial.  Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).-  Whiteley, supra, at
568-569.
  Although Whiteley clearly retains relevance in deter-
mining whether police officers have violated the Fourth
Amendment, see Hensley, supra, at 230-231, its
precedential value regarding application of the
exclusionary rule is dubious.  In Whiteley, the Court
treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation
as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule
to evidence secured incident to that violation.  401 U. S.,
at 568-569.  Subsequent case law has rejected this
reflexive application of the exclusionary rule.  Cf. Krull,
supra; Sheppard, supra; United States v. Leon, 468 U. S.
897 (1984); Calandra, supra.  These later cases have
emphasized that the issue of exclusion is separate from
whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated, see
e.g., Leon, supra, at 906, and exclusion is appropriate
only if the remedial objectives of the rule are thought
most efficaciously served, see Calandra, supra, at 348.
  Our approach is consistent with the dissenting
Justices' position in Illinois v. Krull, our only major case
since Leon and Sheppard involving the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.  In that case, the
Court found that the good-faith exception applies when
an officer conducts a search in objectively reasonable
reliance on the constitutionality of a statute that
subsequently is declared unconstitutional.  Krull, 480
U. S., at 346.  Even the dissenting Justices in Krull
agreed that Leon provided the proper framework for
analyzing whether the exclusionary rule applied; they
simply thought that -application of Leon's stated ration-
ales le[d] to a contrary result.-  480 U. S., at 362
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).  In sum, respondent does not
persuade us to abandon the Leon framework.
  Applying the reasoning of Leon to the facts of this
case, we conclude that the decision of the Arizona
Supreme Court must be reversed.  The Arizona Supreme
Court determined that it could not -support the distinc-
tion drawn . . . between clerical errors committed by law
enforcement personnel and similar mistakes by court
employees,-  177 Ariz., at 203, 866 P. 2d, at 871, and
that -even assuming . . . that responsibility for the error
rested with the justice court, it does not follow that the
exclusionary rule should be inapplicable to these facts,-
ibid.
  This holding is contrary to the reasoning of Leon,
supra; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 480 U. S. 981 (1984);
and, Krull, supra.  If court employees were responsible
for the erroneous computer record, the exclusion of
evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future
errors so as to warrant such a severe sanction.  First, as
we noted in Leon, the exclusionary rule was historically
designed as a means of deterring police misconduct, not
mistakes by court employees.  See Leon, supra, at 916;
see also Krull, supra, at 350.  Second, respondent offers
no evidence that court employees are inclined to ignore
or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness
among these actors requires application of the extreme
sanction of exclusion.  See Leon, supra, at 916, and n.
14; see also Krull, supra, at 350-351.  To the contrary,
the Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified at the
suppression hearing that this type of error occurred once
every three or four years.  App. 37.
  Finally, and most important, there is no basis for
believing that application of the exclusionary rule in
these circumstances will have a significant effect on
court employees responsible for informing the police that
a warrant has been quashed.  Because court clerks are
not adjuncts to the law enforcement team engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,
see Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948),
they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions.  Cf. Leon, supra, at 917; Krull, supra, at
352.  The threat of exclusion of evidence could not be
expected to deter such individuals from failing to inform
police officials that a warrant had been quashed.  Cf.
Leon, supra, at 917; Krull, supra, at 352.
  If it were indeed a court clerk who was responsible for
the erroneous entry on the police computer, application
of the exclusionary rule also could not be expected to
alter the behavior of the arresting officer.  As the trial
court in this case stated: -I think the police officer [was]
bound to arrest.  I think he would [have been] derelict
in his duty if he failed to arrest.-  App. 51.  Cf. Leon,
supra, at 920  (-`Excluding the evidence can in no way
affect [the officer's] future conduct unless it is to make
him less willing to do his duty.'- quoting Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S., at 540 (White, J., dissenting)).  The
Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified that this type
of error occurred -on[c]e every three or four years.-
App. 37.  In fact, once the court clerks discovered the
error, they immediately corrected it, id., at 30, and then
proceeded to search their files to make sure that no
similar mistakes had occurred, id., at 37.  There is no
indication that the arresting officer was not acting
objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police
computer record.  Application of the Leon framework
supports a categorical exception to the exclusionary rule
for clerical errors of court employees.  See Leon, 468
U. S., at 916-922; Sheppard, supra, at 990-991.
  The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is
therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that
court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.